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Being a Teacher� of Lawyers: Discerning 
the Theory of My Practice 
by 
HOWARD LESNICK* 
¥/hen I first expressed interest in participating in this symposium, I 
described the Essay I wanted to write as one speaking to the question, 
what can teachers contribute to practitioners that will be responsive to 
the reality of their work lives in engaging with issues of professional re­
sponsibility and professional identity in practice on behalf of 
subordinated people. Having on that basis ensnared the interest of the 
symposium's organizers, I find that to address the question I need to be 
more explicit than I have heretofore been about what it means (to me) to 
"teach," in particular, to teach people who are or are becoming lawyers. 
I have long been dissatisfied with the prevalent notion of teaching. 
That notion, I believe, is that what we are doing is transmitting some of 
our acquired knowledge and skills, which will be useful to our students in 
their careers. 'vVe have the knowledge (provided that we .keep up our 
scholarship), our students need it, and in teaching we "impart" what we 
havt to them. In describing this concept, Robert Bellah has used a meta­
phor that I, and many of the students with whom I have shared it over 
the years, find distressingly familiar: "The pervasive emphasis on (this] 
instrurne:ntal use of knowledge has tended to make of the university a 
kind of universal filling station where students tank up on knowledge 
they ',viii 'need' later." 1 
':' Jeti'erson B. Fordimm Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This Essay is 
based on a talk given at a symposium entitled "Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of 
Progre:;sive Thought and Action," sponsored by the Hastir1gs Law Journal, the I-iastings Wo­
mm's Law Journal, and the Committee on Clinical Scholarship of the Association of Ameri­
can Ls.w Schools ComrniHee on Clinical Education. 
I am grateful to Carolyn Schodt for (once again) helping me to develop my perception of 
the reaching and practice of law by sharing with me her profound understanding and insight 
abm;t the teaching and practice of nursing. 
1. Robert N. Beilah, The New Religious Consciousness and the Secu lar University. 
DAEDALUS, Fall 1974, at 110, 110, quoted in ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A 
LA\.VYER: i\ HUi\lANISTlC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 18:?. 
(1981). 
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I find this approach woefully deficient. It trivializes both knowledge 
and the utility of knowledge, first by overvaluing its utilitarian over its 
intrinsic worth, then by focusing on narrowly instrumental measures of 
utility while losing sight of the deeper value of knowledge (whether it be 
knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, history, or theory) as a means to 
greater understanding of the world and of oneself. By seeking to justify 
present choices in terms of the future, it excessively dichotomizes the 
present and the future, thereby gravely disserving students' capacity to 
learn to live integrated lives.2  It  both inflates and cabins, in troubling 
ways, the work of the teacher: by exaggerating the value of expertise and 
authority, it denigrates and inhibits the self-teaching capacities of stu­
dents; at the same time, it tends to render "off limits" a teacher's motiva­
tion to engage more than the analytic or argumentative powers of his or 
her students. It delegitimates the authentic expetience and motivation of 
many teachers by fostering a view of research and scholarship as aug­
menting, and of teaching and other student-oriented work as depleting, a 
teacher's "human capital," thereby helping to erect a destructive conflict 
o:f interest between teacher and student. It gives students an implicit 
model of the professional relation that encourages them to adopt a com­
parably crippling view of the attorney-client relation, and an implicit 
model of political life that is profoundly antidemocratic and justificatory 
of inequality. Most fundamentally, it reifies both teacher and student, in 
that it abstracts their roles as teachers and students from their individual 
id;-::ntities; it uses people to teach things, not recognizing (as a wise friend 
long ago said to me) that teaching is using things to teach people. 
"L\ central prop of the prevailing approach is the fear that its rejec­
tion must entail the illegitimate indoctrination or coercion of students, or 
a repellent and self-defeating preaching to (or at) them. I agree that this 
polar consequence is both illegitimate and self-defeating. I acknowledge, 
too, that these concerns need to be taken seriously. Students can easily 
accept (or reject) a teacher's values or world view more as a result of the 
traditional teacher-student role dynamic than out of any sense of the stu­
de:nfs emergent sense of self. 
But I cannot accept as axiomatic the implicit assertion that we must 
choose between polar vices. I regard submission to such a limit on 
choice as vvhat, in an analogous context, K have termed "an act of cosmic 
d·::spair."3 I repeat those words here because I think it important to rec­
o;:;nize tha{ the effort to which I want to give voice in this Essay is an act 
2. S::!! Howard Lesnick, Comment, in DVORKIN ET AL., supra note i, at 88, 88-89. 
' l-Ioward Lesnick, Legal Education's Concern with Justice: A Conversation with a 
(;;�.·;_'. ��5 J. LEGAL Eouc. 414,419 (1985). 
f 
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of hop,::, a refusal to surrender to despair. This effort rests in part on the 
perception that the traditional view contains an element of despair, sel­
dom acknovvledged and almost never confronted squarely, that accounts 
for a significant portion of the weariness and cynicism that too often af­
fEct our profession. 
Cvriously enough, the theory of teaching that I want to articulate is 
embedded in one aspect of the etymology of the word, educate: it is de­
rived from the Latin word, educere, to draw out something latent. To 
me, it revolutionizes the idea of teaching to think of it as bringing out 
something that is in a student, rather than putting something in that the 
student lacks. '�Nhen Socrates demonstrated in the Meno that the slave­
boy "knew" that "the square on the diagonal of a square is double its 
area,"4 to me he was demonstrating, not the latency of some forgotten 
prenatal knowledge, nor his own ability to ask leading questions, but the 
latent ability to transform oneself that is constitutive of being human. 5 
There is somewhere a magnificent line of Albert Schweitzer's, which (as 
best I can remember it) says, there is a physician within each of us, and 
the practice of medicine is the art of bringing out the physician in the 
sick person. 
To draw out of students what is latent inside them, teachers must, I 
believe, put more of ourselves into our engagement with the subject mat­
ter of our teaching.6 At the same time, we must struggle to do this in a 
way that encourages our students to look for more of themselves in their 
responses tu us and to the subject matter. I want to say something about 
each branch of this teacher-student dyad. 
That :t do not :find the path wholly unmarked is in large measure due 
to Roger Cramton. Consider these thoughts of his: 
5ince my thesis is that ultimate questions need to be discussed in 
lmv school, it is only fair that I reveal my tentative and halting views 
4. PLATO, A1ENO, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 370 (Edith 
Hamilton & .Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). 
5. To Socrs.tes, rhc: fact that the boy, ignorant of geometry, could be led to understand 
the relation between the length of a side of a square and its area proved that "learning" was the 
recalling to awau;ness of kno·wledge that the immortal soul had acquired in earlier lives. See 
id. at 3 70-71. 'What this reasoning (taken literally) demonstrates to me is the prenatal exist­
ence of l"k7rtonian thinking. 
b. For example, fo:· most of my teaching career my primary interest has been labor 1a.v:. 
That '>.Yas so, I believe, not merely because it was an interesting, ever-changing fieid or a "hot" 
subject in 1960, 1Nhen I began to teach law. My attraction to the subject is embedded in my 
belief in the centP.lity Jf work to the meaningfulness of human life and the viability of demo­
cratic values. '{:t a.ny manifestation of this belief in my classes was probably wholly implicit. 
For a 1 <.J . .:e c;·:,:J par:ial :>,cknowledgrnent of the connection, see Howard Lesnick, The Conscious­
ness Work and th� Vc7lues ofAmerican Labor Law, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1933) (reviewing 
JAMES 2. :\·ru::sor·;, V.·\LUES AND ASSUMPTIOi'o' IN AMERiCA'! LABOR LAW (!983)). 
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on some of the vital questions: Who am X? What am I doing here? 
\Vhat should I do with my life? There is a risk in opening oneself in 
this manner, but one encouraging belief of mine is that trust in others 
and acceptance of oneself is a crucial predicate of meaningful moral 
discourse. Hence I believe-a belief itself worthy of analysis and criti­
cism-that the effort to be self-consciously critical about our operating 
assumptions requires us to reveal our most deeply held beliefs .... 
What do I profess? Here I am, a struggling pilgrim, beset by 
doubts and anxieties, painfully aware of my own limitations and fail­
ures. Even Moses, when God called to him out of the burning bush, 
replied that he was not adequate to the task of bringing the Jc:wish 
people out of bondage. "But who am I," Moses said, "that I should 
[do these great deeds). ... I am [unworthy] and slow and hesitant in 
speech." And God replied: "Who is it that gives man speech? Is it not 
I? . . . Go now; I will help your speech .... " Well, God has not 
spoken to me, so I cannot rely on a vivid and overpowering personal 
experience. I have had to figure things out for myself as best I could, 
evaluating those parts of my cultural and religious traditions that 
seemed most relevant, consistent, and truthful. 
My own tentative formulation builds on traditional Judea-Chris­
tian ideas of "faith, hope and charity" as well as the idea of justice. 
My basic faith is in the goodness of creation and the sacredness of 
many things but especially the human spirit. These ideas, consistent 
with my experience and reflection, lead me to believe that human life 
has meaning and purpose. . .. 
Love and justice ... are two faces of the same ultimate reality. 
Love is a special problem in today's law school. ... 
"Love" carries connotations of both sexual iove and a shallow, 
other-oriented do-goodism .... We have no word that embodies a 
committed ':Oncern for commonweal, whether the social unit is the 
family or a neighborhood or the workplace or the nation or the 
world .... 
There is something more: to being a fuliy developed human being 
than atomistic selfishness-v;hen each seeks to advance oneself, one's 
tribe, or one's genes at the expense of others, of society, or of nature. 
Even though we may experience it only rarely, love is a reality that, 
like truth, can build communities that are fully human. In an ultimate 
sense, both love and justice come from a source beyond us-a trans­
forming, ennobling source that some c:all God. Love and justice are 
gifts that come to us by grace; they are not things given by government 
or institutional arrangements, although fully human people can help 
by giving them to each other. Law, the efforts of la•Nyers, and the 
chancter of our social and legal arrangements can further them or 
frustrate them. In this view, love and justice CJre relz.tcd: justice must 
I 
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always be informed by love if it is to be just; and love must always meet 
the demands of justice if it is to be loving. 7 
1099 
What 1 take Cramton to be saying, and what I want to say, is that 
our teaching should be informed by our own ongoing engagement with 
the questions: "vVho am I? What am I doing here? What should I do 
with my life?" That Cramton's response to these questions may not be 
yours, or mine, does not undermine his thesis that the questions need to 
be asked.8 Nor does Cramton (or I) present this response as a proposed 
set of lecture notes; he was speaking, not to a class, but to members of a 
student religious organization. Finding ways in which our emergent re­
sponses to these questions can be manifested in our classrooms is a com­
plex and challenging task. vVhat is clear to me is that neither our 
engagement with the questions nor our responses should be suppressed as 
an irrelevant or an intrinsically illegitimate input to our teaching. 
It is not easy-it has not been easy for me-to engage with these 
questions. I have had to bear in mind that responses are not quickly 
packageable, in the classic classroom or courtroom manner. I also have 
had to come to understand that the process of asking fundamental ques­
tions need not be unavoidably bound up with authoritarian religion or 
iotalitarian politics. Cramton carefully prefaced his thoughts with the 
acknowledgment that they derive from his own "religious and cultural 
traditions" and that "the argument from authority is the weakest of all 
arguments--a good starting point, perhaps, but only that. Every belief 
must be tested by one's experience, evaluated for consistency with other 
beliefs that one has found useful and reliable, and compared with con­
trasting views. "9 Certainly, we must continually monitor our tendency 
to confuse deeply held values and beliefs with the truth. At the same 
time, we can acknowledge that our beliefs are contes table ·without 
thereby surrendering our bases for holding them and shaping our lives by 
them. \Ve can reject the idea of unquestionable authority; we can steer 
clear of the hazard of presenting ourselves as such an authority; and we 
can yet retain and acknowledge the wellsprings of our identity. 1 0 In that 
7. Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 509, 516-!8 
(1987) (bracketed words in original) (footnotes omitted). 
8. 1 do not '."Y,mt to allow the importance of recognizing the truth of the statement in the 
text to distance my:;elf from Roger Cramton's answer. I find it a constant source of inspi!·a­
tion, '>Visdom. and beauty. If God did not help his speech. he does remarkable V>'ork on his 
own. 
Cramtcm, s11pm note 7, at 515. 
10. In 2.c!dition t-J Cramton's discussion, id. at 5 i 4-15, I have found the work of Katha­
rine B?.rdet< and Emily Fmvler Hartigan especially helpful to this effort. See Katharine Bart­
len, F.?J»inil"! Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 880-84 (1990); Emily Fow!er Hartigan, 
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:regard, I (and some of my students) have benefited from this classic ad­
monition of George Fox: 
You will say, Christ saith this, and the apostles say this; but what 
canst thou say?11 
1 hese words remind me that the difficulty of freeing one's mind from the 
objectionable coercion of authority (of the merely powerful as well as the 
divine) is in part a product of internalized, and not merely external, 
constraints. 
Recall too that, although Cramton does not shrink from speaking of 
love, and of God, his subject is teaching law. He refuses, as I want to 
refuse, to cabin the role of "lawyer" or "teacher" narrowly off from his 
personhood, recognizing the ways in which our deepest identities inform 
our professional identity. We need to discern the existence of a link be­
tween our responses to questions of professional choice and our most 
fundamental world views. Kenneth Penegar, in articulating the "pillars 
of professionalism" that shaped the Model Code of Professional Responsi­
bility, gave voice as well to what he termed a "competing visionary ideal" 
faintly observable in some aspects of the Model Code. Although he did 
not avow it as his vision, he articulated it in words of extraordinary sensi­
tivity and discernment, words to which I would happily subscribe: 
In the society of the competing visionary ideal, there is a shared 
consciousness wide enough to maintain the individual as primary 
moral agent and at the same time hold to a concrete sense of commu­
nity .... Human cooperation is facilitated in a variety of ways and not 
predominantly through bargained exchange. The definition and place 
of roles, especially vocational and professional ones, are tentative and 
less influential than within the dominant vision. The individual's 
moral autonomy is prominent and not obscured by role and status. 
The democratic ideal is prominent in discourse about the complete 
range of associations and not limited to merely governmental issues. 
The possibilities of social experiment are consciously encouraged, and 
the fo:cms of society needed to shape the good are recognized as unfin­
ished and immanent, still to be expressed, fully discovered and 
attempted.12 
Penegar recognized that this "competing ideal," expressed as it is in 
the borderland of professional and "personal" or "political" value sys­
tems, rests on still more fundamental beliefs. Hear his quotation of some 
The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invitation. 26 1-IARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 67, 
70-74 (1991). 
11. Testin1ony of Margaret Fox, in THE WoRKS OF GEORGE Fox 1:50 (AMS Press 1975) 
( 1831 ). Fox v.;as the founder of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). 
12. Kenneth Penegar, The Fiv:? Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 307, 391-
92 ( 1938) (footnote omitted). 
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concluding passages from Robert Bellah and his associates' recent study 
of contemporary America, Habits of the Heart: 
Perhaps life is not a race whose only goal is being foremost . . . . 
Perhaps . .. there are practices of life, good in themselves, that are 
inherently fulfilling. Perhaps work that is intrinsically rewarding is 
better for human beings than work that is only extrinsically rewarded. 
Perhaps enduring commitment to those we love and civic friendship 
toward our fellow citizens are preferable to restless competition and 
anxious self-defense. Perhaps common worship, in which we express 
our gratitude and wonder in the face of the mystery of being itself, is 
the most important thing of all. If so, we will have to change our lives 
and begin to remember what we have been happier to forget. 
We will need to remember that we did not create ourselves, that 
we owe what we are to the communities that formed us . . . .  13
What I aspire, then, to present more fully to my students is myself 
as a teacher and a lawyer, to share some of the aspirations for the 
teacher-student and attorney-client relations that have made them (at 
times) seem a fit context in which to live my life. My goal is in part an 
instrumental one. It is to invite my students to ask themselves 'Nhat be­
ing a lawyer means, or can come to mean, to them. So, in teaching Pro­
fessional Responsibility, I use the "law of lawyering"-both doctrinal 
development and theoretical critiques-to evoke in students their own 
responses to questions much like Cramton's, questions about themselves 
as emergent lawyers. My goal is to teach students to ask themselves: 
Who am I? 
In my work as a lawyer, what will I be doing in the world? 
What do I want to be doing in the world? 
My aim is not to avow a particular set of answers as i:he truth, nor to 
lead students to reach answers like mine, nor even to teach them the 
relevant arguments in support of differing answers. It is rather to avo•.:v 
the appropriateness of asking the questions, and to engage with whatever 
answers the questions call forth. Teaching, to me, is evoking that engage­
ment. Imparting information, whether about these questions or my or 
anyone else's answers to them, a fortiori about the law of Professional 
Responsibility, is a valuable part of teaching insofar as it tends to aid that 
process, as it often can; it is a positive interference with teaching when it 
tends to shut that process down, as it often does.14 
13. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: lND!YlDUALlSivl AND ::=oM­
MITMENT JN AMERICAN LIFE 295 (1985), quoted in Penegar, supra note 12, at 391 n.253. 
14. It should be clear, therefore, that l am not denying my responsibility to o.ss�r-= stu­
dents the means of learning "the law of lawyering" (or of any other subject I might teach). My 
goal is that knowledge of the law be "imparted" as a by-product of the central enterprise de­
scribed in the text, not for its own sake. My view is close to that articulated by Erwin Chemer­
insky, Training the Ethical Lawyer: A Rejoinder to Schneyer. 1986 AM. B. ?OUl'iD. REs. J. 
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What I have said is not meant to privilege responses that focus on 
love or on God. I think of two colleagues, past and present, both rigor­
ously secular in their avowals: one, a litigator and mentor of litigators, 
who sees in lawyering a combative and potentially effective vehicle for 
acting on feelings of outrage at the perpetrators, defenders, and benefi­
ciaries of injustice; one, a student and critic of the contours of the sub­
stantive law, who sees in law a means of holding individuals responsible 
for their antisocial acts, in the name of their own personhood as well as 
of the protection of a concededly flawed social order. Through engage­
ment with such teachers, students (and fellow teachers as well) can de­
rive intellectual challenge, spiritual sustenance, and insight into their 
own nascent visions of law as a vocation. There need not be any special 
congruence between a student's vision and a teacher's. All that is needed 
is for teachers to present their ideas as responses to fundamental ques­
tions of identity and purpose, as aspects of themselves, and not only as 
"legal" positions; and to do so not primarily to espouse or test the cor · 
rectness of their responses or the ability of students to contend over their 
correctness, but to draw out-to educe-a similar process of self-defini­
tion in their students. 1 5  
I have drawn a contrast between the process of "engagement" and 
the exchange of expositions or arguments in support of teachers' and stu­
dents' presentations. That process of engagement is a relational, and not 
merely an instrumental, interaction. Although it may contain, it is not 
dominated by, a desire to affect another's world view. In its noninstru­
mental aspect, it seeks simply to present oneself authentically to the 
other, and to the world; 1 6  in its instrumental aspect, it seeks to "impart" 
to students an enhanced capacity to realize their own selfhood. The de­
livery of that "tank of gas" is what teaching is to me. i 7  
959. I have attempted t o  make m y  goal explicit, and to articulate its premises, i n  the Introduc­
tion to my coursebook, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSJBILiTY IN 
THE PRACTICE OF LAw (forthcoming 1992). (Some of what is written in that In:rcduction, 
and in this paper, is a revision of portions of an earlier unpublished paper, excerpts of which 
were quoted or paraphrased by Cramton, supra note 7, at 5 1 0- 1 3 . I hope thai my hospitality 
to his words has not been influenced unduly by his earlier hospitality to mine). 
1 5 . See the discussion, and accompanying references, regarding the idea of "i nvitation," 
in Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Per­
s.oectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 4 1 3 ,  443,  452-54. 
1 6. See the discussion in id. at 45 3-54. 
1 7. Jack Sammons finds the thought expressed in the text too accepting of "the opinions, 
aspirations, (and] judgment" that students bring to us as teachers. In felicitous terms, he as­
serts, ' 'the truth stands in judgment of both the student and the teacher, ' ·  and (2tt1ibu ting the 
words to Stanley Hauerwas) observes: "Kindness is not treating the other as he is, but treating 
him as if he is capable of a good that he does not now possess, but is capable cf possessing . "  
Letter from Jack L .  Sammons, Jr . ,  Professor of  Law, Mercer University, to Eo•t�ard Lesnick, 
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·what are the implications of this theory of teaching1 8 for the 
teacher-practitioner reiation, that is, for the work of a teacher as it is 
oriented toward practicing lawyers, rather than law students (or fellow 
teachers)? The short answer may be that most of us are happy to abjure 
that undertaking; academics tend to regard practitioners as providing a 
terrain in which to "teach" that is as unwelcoming as it is infertile. I 
have no dispositive response to that answer, other than to note that the 
"happiness" of many teachers, particularly those interested in the legal 
representation of poor or otherwise disadvantaged people, with this state 
of affairs is more than a little alloyed. Indeed, this symposium is one (but 
not the only) manifestation of a desire to find ways in which academics 
can be more helpful as academics (that is,  other than as participants in 
litigation planning or brief-writing) to those who are actually "doing it . ' '  
Recalling again that I a m  here attempting t o  articulate a theory o f  teach­
ing practitioners, I will say no more about the existence, present or po­
tential, of a market for our talents. 
IV1any academic lawyers share a desire to be of assistance to lawyers 
for disempowered people in ways that go beyond the limitations of doc-­
trinally or strategically oriented presentations, perceiving that such activ­
ities, although an undeniably worthy and useful contribution of a 
teacher's knowledge and skill, nonetheless fall seriously short of contrib­
uting all that teachers have to offer. At its best, theoretical scholarship 
addressed to the practice of law can be saliently powerful: Stephen "'vVex.­
ler's landmark effort to reconceptualize "Practicing Law for Poor Peo­
ple, " 19 and Peter Gabel and Paul Harris' attempt to bring the insights of 
critical legal theory to bear on the practice of law, 20 are classic examples 
Jefferson B.  Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylv;mia (Mar. 20, 1 992\ (on file 
with the Hastings Law Journal). 
I compietely agree with these insights, but believe that the processes of "engagement" and 
·'invitation" thai I ha,;e sketched here are a legitimate and effective means of evoking a stu­
dent's capacity to change. For a brief discussion bearing on the question whether such an 
approach can escape the polar vices of disguised proselytizing and contentless "values clarifica­
tion," see Howard Lesnick, The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in 
an A iternatlve Consciousness of La>')yering at�d Law, 1 0  NOVA L.J. 633,  64 1 - 43 (1986). 
1 8 .  I take refuge in the f<1ct tilat  I am writing about "the theory of my pro.ctice," and not 
the prac tice of my theory, to j ustify saying no more than I have about the very real difficulties, 
risks, and pitfalls involved in attempting to implement the theCJry. I have chos�n to l imit my 
topic in this way in order to overcome the tendency to express objection:' to a theory in terms 
of its p ract:icaliiy rather than to engage directly Vlith its espousal as an aspiration. Proceeding 
immediately to engage with a theory at the level of i rnpL:mentation, congenial 9.S it is to pmb­
lem-sc]vi n g  lawyers, can lead to a "shadow" discussion, silently shaped by an unackr10wledged 
difference o v e r  the 2�ppeal of the theory itself. 
1. 9 .  Skp;ten We;der, Practicing LaH'  fiJr Poor People. 79 YALE L.J.  1 049 ( 1 970) . 
20. Peter Gabe1 & Paul I-!arris. _Building Potver end .Breaking Irnages: C'ritica! Legal �Thc­
o;:v und the .Practice o/ Law, 1 i N.Y.U.  REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 3 69 ( 1 982-83) .  
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of what can be done. It is a truly heartening moment m a grievously 
disheartening world to see in the participants in this symposium a rising 
generation of academic lawyers with insight, energy, and devotion. By 
calling, in the name of the "teaching" of practitioners, for something dif­
ferent from that genre, I am in no way denying its strengths and impor­
tance. I am not seeking to supplant what emergent theoretical 
scholarship is doing, but only to suggest that there may also be a place 
for the conception of the teacher-student relation that I have attempted 
to articulate here in the domain of practice as well as school. 
The hazard of theoretically oriented presentations, inherent in their 
very power, is that they have a tendency to be experienced by their ad­
dressees--especially by practitioners-as critical of who they are, rather 
than of what at times they do or the ways in which they are accustomed 
to think. Like most legal writing, such presentations tend to be prescrip­
tive in their tone-what James Boyd White has felicitously termed, 
"structurally coercive"2 1 -rather than sharing or disclosing the person of 
the speaker, and inviting one's hearers to "try on" a sonle">v:hat different 
understanding of their work. 
If we are to "invite" rather than "prescribe , "  it is necessary not only 
to present ourselves authentically, but also to meet others on their ovm 
terrain. To do this requires that we be willing to engage with rather than 
judge or dismiss the existential realities of practice. vVe should not pre­
sume that the inhospitality of many practitioners to "acade:rr1.ic" ideas is 
simply a product of their unreflective or anti-intellectual mindset. Con­
sider some of the characteristics that many practitioners manifest : an 
impatience with "theoretical" notions lacking immediate payoff for the 
job at hand; a reluctance to question established norrns of practice; a 
tendency to blame shortfalls on governmental and taxpayer hostility; a 
frustrating mix of inferiority and superiority about the choice (theirs and 
ours) between teaching and practice; an amalgam of feelings of pride and 
self-denigration in representing disvalued people and causes for egre­
giously inadequate pay and other forms of recognition from the profes­
sion; and a righteous refusal to question their own reliance on traditional 
f d 
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the oppression of their clients. 
To "teach" practitioners would, in my conceptim1, b :  to make this 
array of responses a central part of the agenda rather an unspoken. 
barrier to proceeding with it. It would, for exampl:;, ac knov;l<::dg-
2 1 .  James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Litercnn-2?. 1 02 E.<''. -I. L FI.E'i. 
?.0 1 4, 20 1 7  ( 1 99 1 ) .  
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ing and engaging directly with the fact that questioning the socialization 
of the law office can undermine one's ability to present oneself as pre­
pared and knowledgeable. It would seek at the same time to enhance 
lawyers' awareness of the loss, as well as the gain, in allowing that exi­
gency to control one's responses. In making that effort, this teaching 
would be seeking to displace reflexive action with conscious choice, 
neither dismissing barriers to change nor accepting without reflection the 
dispositive character of those barriers. 
As with the teacher-student and lawyer-client relations, the task, as 
I see it, is to keep the responsibility of teacher and practitioner shared. 
The teacher's task is to strengthen the practitioner's experience of choice 
in his or her work, while genuinely leaving the practitioner space to e:xtr .. 
cise that choice. Teacher and practitioner need one another, even though 
each often experiences the other negatively. Practitioners, like all of us, 
need teachers (as well as academic lecturers, co-counsel, and critics), if 
they are to continue to grow, to keep striving to realize themselves in 
their work, to hold at bay the experience of meaninglessness and �)l.::rn 
out that laps at our feet in all that we do. But teachers need practiti c•ners 
as well, to ground their thinking in the concrete settings in ·v hidt :tt is 
played out. Practitioners have the experience and the confidence to ;rro · 
vide a source of feedback that goes beyond what students can u�ms:Uy 
give us. And there is learning for the teacher even in the negative c r  
inhospitable responses of practitioners, for just as practitioners can 1ts.n.\ 
from teachers to open themselves to unacknowledged choice and res pon ­
sibility, so can teachers benefit from what practitioners have to say nb):J1: 
the limitations on choice. 
I hope that this glimpse of some ways in which "the theory c:f F.r:y 
practice" as a teacher might be applicable to work that I would E1,(e to d.o 
with practitioners will strike a responsive chord among some tea·.�h,:::f3., 
and some practitioners. Even as theory, it stands in substantial r:�:ed t)F 
further thought and articulation; and the challenges of implementa':icn 
are formidable. Some will surely think the enterprise misguided c:oncc::p­
tually, or the difficulties of implementation so self-evidently dispositi",;:;: .as 
to justify disdaining the project. If, however, there are some wllD Ji:cj 
what I have written resonant with their deepest aspirations for their �'iDrk 
as a teacher, K ;,vould wekome the opportunity to explore vvifh ·j·i·::: 
tasks of articulation and implementation. For in undertaking thes<'." - � ci.S1<:s, 
I need colleagues. More than that, I need teachers. 
